Off topic

The last week has been kind of a snooze-fest from a research perspective. I've actually done some useful stuff, but it all falls into a couple of categories:

1) Too close to my core thinking for the thesis; don't want to post online.
2) More review of Copenhagen 2009 news; continues to confirm stuff I've already said; not interesting from a posting perspective.

Other than that, mostly on the side I'm doing reading for my next TA gig. So have some quotes:

Most favorite political philosopher quote from Week 2 readings:
Bertrand Russell: "Men who allow their love of power to give them a distorted view of the world are to be found in every asylum: one man will think he is the Governor of the Bank of England, another will think he is the King, and yet another will think he is God. Highly similar delusions, if expressed by educated men in obscure language, lead to professorships of philosophy; and if expressed by emotional men in eloquent language, lead to dictatorships." (Power: A New Social Analysis)

Least favorite political philosopher quote from Week 2 readings:
Emile Durkheim: "...woman can endure life in isolation more easily than man. When a widow is seen to endure her condition much better than a widower and desires marriage less passionately, one is led to consider this ease in dispensing with the family a mark of superiority; it is said that woman's affective faculties, being very intense, are easily employed outside the domestic circle, while her devotion is indispensable to man to help him endure life. Actually, if this is her privilege it is because her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly developed. As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she is less penetrated* by it; society is less necessary to her because she is less impregnated* with sociability. She has few needs in this direction and and satisfies them easily. With a few devotional practices and some animals to care for, the old unmarried woman's life is full. If she remains faithfully attached to religious traditions and thus finds ready protection against suicide, it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs. Man, on the contrary, is hard beset in this respect. As his thought and activity develop, they increasingly overflow these antiquated forms. But then he needs others. Because he is a more complex social being, he can maintain his equilibrium only be finding more points of support outside himself, and it is because his moral balance depends on a larger number of conditions that it is more easily disturbed." (Suicide)


* Ooh, clever, Durkheim.

Drama from the 2009 negotiations

This account of what went wrong in 2009 in the Copenhagen climate negotiations - especially behind the scenes - is really worth reading; it quotes at the end the entirety of Yvo de Boer's rather unhappy "how did this happen" email (de Boer was the head of UNFCCC during the 2009 negotiations).

The short story is that the Danish government got overly ambitious in its attempts to manage (and pre-manage) the outcome, and this, at the very least, helped negotiations break down.

It's a really interesting story, though in some ways a complicating factor for me. My belief is that Copenhagen was never likely to be VERY successful (and assessments of the buzz going into the round, I think, suggests this is true) and hence this drama, though unhelpful, may not have made ALL that much difference; but how to prove it?

News Roundup, 6.17.11

Not as much going on this week, overall...


General News
Gore lauds Romney on climate position (The Hill, June 15)
This is seen as a death blow to Romney's nomination chances by Rush Limbaugh (The Hill's link refers to it as a "death hug").

The biggest single source of general news this week has been on-going negotiations in Australia over a carbon tax. I frankly haven't been following this, so about all I can say about it is that it seems to be complex; I've heard it would be one of the most serious carbon control plans out there at the national level if passed; and I have no idea what the likely outcome is. Have a few links for flavor:
Carbon tax rift emerges between Labor, Greens (ABC News, June 17)
Govt ad campaign rocks carbon boat (Sydney Morning Herald, June 16)
Australia power industry fears "even worse" carbon plan (Reuters, June 16)

Meanwhile, S. Korea's CO2 trade bill receives bipartisan backing (Reuters Africa, June 15)
South Korea moving ahead with a carbon emissions trading bill, after opposition from industry was pacified with increased free carbon allowances and softer penalties for non-compliance.

Markets: Emergence, Sizing, Shifts, etc.
Carbon management market could near $6 bln in six years: research (RTT News, June 10)
This is the market for carbon management software and services, basically.

Green Policy Centers
Clean technology emerges as driver of B.C. economy (The Vancouver Sun, June 15)
Vancouver rises...

Clean-tech industry losing momentum (Boulder Country Business Report, June 15)
...Boulder sinks?

The China paradox, circa 2009

Doing a run through the news narrative for the 2009 COP-15 meeting of the climate change negotiations really makes it starkly clear why they failed, I think.

China is at the heart of it. On the one hand, China was making really absurd demands for huge emissions cuts from the developed countries. On the other hand, you have quite a lot of buzz in the year prior to the negotiating round about how hard China is working on cutting energy use and emissions. Take this FT article, for instance:

China will be in the forefront of combating climate change by 2020 if it meets government targets on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the International Energy Agency suggest. ... "If China reaches its targets... its emissions [growth] will have declined so much by 2020 that it will be the country that has achieved the largest emissions reductions. ... China's strong showing in curbing emissions will make negotiations on a global agreement on climate change easier (emphasis mine). (Financial Times, Sept. 21, 2009)

The two things are contradictory. "China is taking emissions seriously and that will make negotiating easier" vs. "China is making huge, plainly impossible negotiating demands." People had to square that contradiction mentally, and unfortunately, they ended up paying more attention to the optimistic side of the contradiction than to the pessimistic side.

That mistake, I think, comes back to a fundamental misread of what was going on in China domestically. Yes, China was making huge efforts to cut the energy (and hence emissions) intensity of its population and industry. But it wasn't doing that because it was seeing the light on emissions. As I've said before, it was doing that because in order to maintain stability it must continue providing increasing economic growth and improving living standards to its populace. That means huge increases in the additional power needed, which are simply physically hard to meet purely by increasing supply. So China is also pushing hard on the demand side, trying to reduce energy needed per person and per unit GDP.

It was also exacerbated by the fact that around the same time, the US was starting to look like more and more of an obstacle. People have limited cognitive scope, and with one obstacle apparently growing, there was a cognitive pressure to be optimistic about China in a "the REAL problem is the US; China's fine!" sort of way, I think.

To the west, China looked like it might be getting serious about emissions. It wasn't.

Issue linkage in the Law of the Sea

Haas (1980) writes, when considering the difference between regime construction around money and around the Law of the Sea (LOS) that

The LOS negotiations... constituted a case of 'premature' issue-packaging. The package was the result of a negotiating strategy adopted by the weak - first in UNCTAD and later in all international economic forums. ... Ocean-related resources constitute a very heterogeneous group of concerns, united only by the fact that they are situated on or under the water. 

[Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate?: Issue Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics, v. 2, n.3 (Apr. 1980)]

This is actually wrong - I mean, really wrong. It's true that LOS issues - which included everything from deep-sea mining rights to fishing rights to rights of passage to pollution - seem very heterogeneous at first glance. But they're all inextricably interlocked because they were all seen as having bearing on the issue of expanding territoriality. There was an increasing trend toward nations with coastlines claiming ever-expanding sections of the adjacent seas, and ever-expanding rights over it. A lot of the LOS negotiations were driven by the desire by some states to get this trend under control and set stable limits on it.

This is precisely why some of the early compromise plans - which tried compromising on allowing partial or specific rights over expanded coastal ocean areas but stopped short of giving territorial control over them - didn't satisfy people. Partial or specific rights were seen as stepping-stones to real or de facto territorial claims. ("Why, Mr. President, I just have to have my war fleet patrol these seas and hassle your nation's ships! It's to protect my seabed mining rights! You wouldn't want me to allow manganese poaching, would you?") Therefore, you couldn't satisfy states that were worried about territorial claims creep without negotiating all these things together and settling them as a package.

Haas seems to be suggesting that when issues were added, they were added not because they were a natural part of the bundle of issues but because states decided to add them strategically, to get leverage on something. That's not so - there were issues added, but largely, I think, because they were previously unrecognized issues that fit naturally into the existing bundle but which states only became aware of part-way through.

This is not to say there was nothing strategic going on - there was. But what was going on was the recognition and intentional exploitation of useful pre-existing reciprocalities in desires within sets of issues that did naturally go together - not the random addition of "stuff that has to do with the sea" in order to change the playing field.

News roundup 6.10.11

Researchers say climate change may be cooling California (Sacramento Bee, June 4)
I've been wondering about this ever since I moved back here. This is not the weather that I remember from my childhood.

Chinese airline group 'totally opposes' EU's emission plan (Bloomberg, June 5)
The EU wants to bring aviation into a cap and trade plan? Cap and trade works best where there are known solutions to emissions that caps can provide incentives to implement. My impression is that's not the case with airlines, so in this case I have some sympathy for the airlines - one can't help wondering if some other solution might be better in this case.

However, EU offers solution to China in row over aviation CO2 (Reuters, June 5)
Probably not one that will make China very happy, though: its airlines will be allowed an exemption if it can prove it's taking comparable steps to reduce aviation emissions at home.

German cabinet decides on nuclear exodus by 2022 (Reuters Africa, June 6)
Not a surprise.

And, LNG demand rises as nuclear power is shunned (The Telegraph, June 6)
The shift away from nuclear is expected to increase demand for natural gas, tightening that market and driving prices up. That's probably a good thing for renewable energy, which has a tougher slog the cheaper natural gas is.

Thus, unsurprisingly, Chubu expects CO2 emissions to jump due to nuke plant shutdown (Reuters, June 8)
LNG power has a higher carbon content than nuclear power. (Similarly, Germany's nuclear energy blunder, The Washington Post, June 1; Berlin bets big on renewable energy, Financial Times.com, June 8)

Speaking of which, Golden age of gas may be a call too soon (Financial Times, June 7)
Interesting review of how the global natural gas market works. Bottom line: a lot of gas pricing is still tied up in long-term contracts that index the price of gas to the price of oil. However, the current trend is toward gas-to-gas pricing, in which gas is priced against its own spot market rather than oil (this is the current favored mechanism in the US). The latter makes for a better, more globalized market.

World Bank eyes a network of carbon markets in a make-or-break decade (Bloomberg, June 6)
Developing countries as incubators for a bunch of different carbon-pricing or other market experiments?

Romney draws early fire from conservatives over views on climate change (The Washington Post, June 8)
Romney takes the position that climate change is real and man-made; predictable results on the right.

Canada confirms it will reject new Kyoto Protocol (Reuters, June 8)
Canada, Japan, and Russia have all confirmed they won't support extending Kyoto through a second commitment period after 2012.

Technology breakthrough news for the week
New battery design could give electric vehicles a jolt (MITnews, June 6)
Slurry batteries could allow "gas-station" style refueling for batteries.

US solar power nears competing on price (Financial Times.com, June 8)
Importance self-evident.

And now for something completely different

I got an email a few days back that was totally unrelated to climate change. In college I got on this mailing list that aggregates and distributes reports of outbreaks of diseases of interest. Though I don't do bio anymore, lately I stay on it because the mailing list's editors often include little tidbits of background and explanation about the news blurbs they post, so it's an on-going practical education in which diseases epidemiologists care about (including the less famous ones), how they relate to population behavior, what the differential diagnoses are, how they're controlled, and so on.

This digest had an article about dog displacement in India. Dog displacement refers to capturing feral dogs in an area where they're causing problems (biting people, spreading rabies, etc.) and transporting them some ways away from the population center where, supposedly, they'll be less of a problem (or somebody else's problem).

From the perspective of rabies control, this is a problem in two ways. First, displaced dogs may have rabies, since rabies can take quite a while to show symptoms. So dog displacement can spread rabies around an area much more quickly and uncontrollably than natural churn would. Second, areas cleaned of dogs don't stay that way for long. New dogs move in. These new dogs may have rabies (even if your old population didn't), and because they're new to the area, they'll be more on edge and less familiar with the local people - more prone to fighting and biting. So from a rabies control perspective, it's much better to create a local feral population of dogs that have all been vaccinated against rabies. The article quotes Dr. Lisa Warden, managing director of ABC India: "A stable population of vaccinated dogs is one of the best defenses against rabies in rabies-endemic locations as they keep new, possibly unvaccinated, potentially rabid dogs out of their areas."

This reminded me of Laurie Garrett's The Coming Plague, a book whose text is somewhat less scaremongering than its title would suggest. It's a series of analyses of the emergence and spread of several different diseases, and the basic message is, new disease emerge (and controlled, stable flows of old diseases blow up into epidemics) when some shift in the ecosystem occurs - a population moves or begins to behave differently, and this offers a new niche or transmission mechanism for the disease. You then have epidemics, until the population figures out what's going on and adopt new behaviors that control it.

So back to climate change. The standard line on climate change and disease is that as temperatures rise, tropical diseases will migrate further and further from the equator because their tropical hosts - like the mosquitoes that carry malaria, which could become a disease of the American south.

But what's more interesting to me to think about is how shifts in behavior, migrations of populations, and so on may destabilize ecosystems, resulting in new niches and transmission methods for diseases. What new diseases might emerge as animal populations shift in response to climate? What old diseases will blow up in when they find new niches? How will human behaviors change and what unexpected effects will that have on the opportunities open to microorganisms? When I was chatting about this with a friend who was interested in the same subject, one thing we thought of was this: when it comes to the emissions impact of meat sources, beef is the worst (because cows are ruminants). Chickens and pigs are better. But chickens and pigs living in close proximity to humans provides more opportunity for the passing back and forth of various strains of influenza. If climate change control efforts caused a large-scale shift away from cows toward pigs and chickens as meat sources in the US, would it affect the epidemiology of influenza in the US?

Numbers and scale

Lately I've been trying to get a better sense of overall scale so that I can fit numbers into it when I hear them. I'm trying to put together sets of numbers for reference. These may be of interest to others.


Emissions
(Source: EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/globalghg.html; IPCC 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/figure-spm-3.html)

• Total global GHG emissions: ~around 30 Gigatons of CO2 (GtCO2/yr) (current); ~49 Gigatons of CO2 equivalents (GtCO2e/yr) (2004)
• Global GHG emissions in 1990, the Kyoto Protocol's index year: ~22 GtCO2/yr; ~39 GtCO2e/yr
• US emissions: ~7 GtCO2/yr
• Average US power plant's yearly greenhouse gas emissions: ~1 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents

(Note the difference between CO2 and CO2 equivalents.)

Other Greenhouse Gases:
Some other greenhouse gases, with global warming potential as a multiple of carbon dioxide (source: EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05002.htm; IPCC 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/figure-spm-3.html):

• CO2 - 1
• Methane (CH4) - 21
• Nitrous oxide (N2O) - 310
• Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC)-134a - 1,300

These are emitted in smaller quantities than CO2 (CO2 makes up around 77% of greenhouse gas emissions when figured as CO2e), which is why you don't hear way more about them. But they ARE important. I've heard some people argue that we should be focusing more on methane than on CO2 right now, because it's effect occurs faster; and I've read that the single most effective international action taken versus climate change was in fact the Montreal Protocol controlling ozone-depleting substances (most of which are also potent GHGs).

Temperature
(Source: EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/Climate_Basics.pdf)

• How much we've warmed over the past century: 1.3 degrees F
• How much further we're on track to warm no matter what: about 1 degree F
• Current international consensus on the threshold of warming we want to avoid going past: 2 degrees C (roughly 3.6 degrees F)
• Likely average temperature rise by 2100 under business as usual scenarios: 3 to 7 degrees F (but note that emissions have lately been rising at worst-case scenario rates, so the higher value is considered more likely than the lower)

Money
The fact is, it's highly disputed how much climate change mitigation will cost. I've heard "2% of GDP" thrown around a lot as an expected cost of climate change mitigation. But there are those who would argue that that's too low, and those who would argue it's too high, and both arguments have some merit. Here I'm just going to give some representative numbers to give a sense of scale (source: Global Warming Gridlock, Victor 2011):

• What the EU thinks developing countries will need to be given to help them carry out climate change mitigation: $100B per year.
• What China estimated it would need to be given to help it carry out climate change mitigation: over $400B.
• What an MIT team estimated the developing world would need to be paid to cut world emissions in half by 2050: $400B to $3T per year, rising from 2020 to 2050.
• Rough amount of money channeled to developing countries over the lifetime of the Kyoto's Protocol (not per year) via the Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, the current largest international funding source: $50B

For adaptation, things are in my opinion even shakier to estimate, because it depends on how bad the situation you're adapting to is, and there are tipping points whose arrival are hard to predict. However, to give a sense of scale, a recent estimate by the EPA's sea-level experts found that it would cost about $1 trillion in direct costs to fortify the contiguous US against a three-foot sea level rise.

How Much Can the West Do On Its Own?

A lot of developing countries take the position that right now, the burden of cutting emissions should be taken on by the developed countries, while developing countries continue to develop on business as usual (BAU) curves or with moderate controls that slow but don't stop their emissions growth. Is this workable?

I'm not sure I fully understand this yet, but here's my first shot at it. The IPCC 2007 report contains a set of scenarios that assume different GHG projections and the expected warming associated with them: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/figure-spm-5.html. If I'm reading this correctly, the B1 scenario keeps warming to around 2 degrees C, which is considered mostly "safe." In this scenario, emissions are assumed to rise to around 56 GtCO2e/yr by 2030 and 58 GtCO2e/yr in 2040, and decline fairly sharply thereafter.

So, to figure this out, you need projections of the developing world's business as usual emissions trajectory and how much room (if any) that curve leaves underneath the B1 scenario - that's how much developed countries would have to reduce their collective emissions to to do it all on their own. I'm obviously not the first person to have thought of this. Here's a study that suggests it simply doesn't leave enough for developed countries to get down to under any realistic scenario (note that I've just skimmed this.) They figure China's emissions alone at between 11 and 19 GtCO2e/yr by 2030, with the total developing world at between 23 and 37 GtCO2e/yr (the paper uses carbon equivalents rather than CO2 equivalents; the conversion factor is 1 Ce to 44/12 CO2e). They use what looks to me like a more stringent emissions reduction curve than the IPCC B1 scenario, though. In the immortal words of Barbie, modeling is hard; let's go shopping.

Progressive vs. gridlocked treaties

I've realized I need a set of concepts that I haven't seen defined yet: on-going treaties, and their two sub-categories: let's call them progressive on-going treaties and gridlocked on-going treaties.

What I mean by this is that some "treaties" aren't so much treaties as they are multi-year processes, on-going efforts at managing some problem toward a solution or just toward on-going control of the problem. These processes occur because something about the nature of the issue area requires an on-going process. There are several reasons why this could happen: perhaps because the problem is an inherently chronic one that requires long-term management; perhaps because the problem to be solved is not fully understood and requires a process of discovery; perhaps because the solutions needed to solve the problem require development over time. But probably the most important reason these crop up is that a full solution is not politically possible at the outset and requires multiple rounds, perhaps with ratcheting up of the strength of multilateral action over time.

Sometimes these multi-year processes are going well and producing additional pay-offs in each round. An example of this is the process surrounding ozone-depleting substances: in this process, multiple meetings over time led to progressive ratcheting down of ODS emissions. Each round tended to produce further progress.

But sometimes these multi-year processes get gridlocked; they go round and round in circles, or each round of negotiation shipwrecks on the same set of problems that plagued the last one; or gains prove fleeting, with gains made in one round followed by slacking off rather than effective ratcheting up. The climate negotiation process seems to be an example of this. It gets called out constantly for all these problems.

People talk about gridlock specifically in the climate negotiations, but I haven't actually seen someone use this idea that negotiations can be an on-going management process and that that PROCESS can be progressive or gridlocked. But it's a different concept of success that is focused less on whether things are moving toward a successful end goal and more on whether the treaty is healthy in process and is producing an on-going series of gains.

The answer might be in the regime literature; climate negotiations might want to produce a "treaty", but the process of on-going institutionalized negotiation with intermediate goals might better be understood as an on-going regime. But I think that literature misses this point in other ways. Regime research gets the "on-going" part, but doesn't necessarily start from the same assumption of movement toward attainment of a goal or ever-increasing level of management of a problem. Regimes do change over time, but it isn't their goal to change over time, the way it is the goal of a negotiation process. Treaty-making is still about creating rules; regimes typically assume the rules have (largely) been created, though they may be added to.

Binding vs. non-binding treaties

David Victor (Global Warming Gridlock, 2011) suggests that non-binding treaties may, in at least some circumstances, be better than binding treaties. Looking at a set of treaties that have included both, he states,

The experiences with international cooperation to regulate pollution in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and to regulate the emissions that cause acid rain in Europe are all examples where binding and nonbinding instruments were deployed side-by-side. In each, the nonbinding rules proved much more effective. (226)

Granted, binding rules are more likely to be complied with than non-binding rules:

...the few studies that have tried to measure compliance with binding international pollution agreements generally find that compliance is just about perfect. By contrast compliance with nonbinding accords is generally much lower. (228)

But nonbinding accords still net a better outcome:

Good news about compliance is often bad news about effect cooperation. When dealing with problems marked by lots of uncertainty, a pristine record on compliance is an indicator that governments are setting commitments too modestly. Looking just at compliance, binding accords almost always perform better than nonbinding ones. But when correcting for the content of the accords - which is nearly always more ambitious in comparable nonbinding accords precisely because there are fewer penalties for falling short - often the nonbinding accords perform better. (228)

In other words, half of an ambitious loaf is better than all of a conservative loaf.

I can't help suspecting, though, that this result is more reliable when most or all of the parties actually want to cooperate (ie, if they'd all actually like to promise more and are restrained from doing so by the potential for penalties if they overpromise and fail in a binding accord) than it is in a case where some or many of the parties may actually prefer to do as little as possible and free-ride on the efforts of others.

News roundup

One of the things I prefer to do is keep up on news, both because it gives me a sense of the narrative as it unfolds and because it makes it less likely that my advisor will pop out with some piece of news he thinks I ought to know about that I don't. I thought since I tend to be a bit burned out on Friday anyway, I might dedicate Fridays to pulling together what news mattered that week, with commentary if I feel like it. This will probably be a combination of articles I actually thought were important and articles I thought were funny. I leave it to you to guess which is which.

UN chief challenges world to agree tougher target for climate change (Guardian, June 1)
In other words, head of UN framework convention on climate change calls for world to set even more stringent carbon target than the one we're already not going to make.

Climate change seen worsening weed problem (UPI.com, June 1)
Just in case you didn't have enough to worry about. (See also ragweed allergies on the rise due to climate change.)

The new weather is going to make food prices soar (Fast Company, June 1)
Article suggests it's already happening in China.

Carbon emissions at highest level ever; data shows they are growing (theenergycollective.com, June 1)
Carbon emissions up; film at 11.

China energy: supply vs. demand (Financial Times beyondbrics blog, May 31)
China has a heavily regulated electricity market, with prices sometimes lower than costs. It just approved a hike in prices, which is a step toward reform.

New NASA map reveals tropical forest carbon storage (JPL, May 31)
NASA maps the 247 billion tons of carbon stored in forests, and it's durn pretty.

California leads US in clean energy (Orange County Register, May 30)
Based on an index that uses 70 factors and might conceivably be useful to me at some future date...

India takes unique path to lower carbon emissions (moneycontrol.com, May 30)
India trying out a novel efficiency-based twist on market-based mechanisms, trading credits earned by energy savings. Not sure what to think of this.

New Jersey quits RGGI, bans coal plants (Environmental Leader, May 27)
You win some, you lose some? The RGGI is a the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a north east state regional cap and trade program. There's been a lot of hype about these kinds of sub-national regional carbon pricing arrangements, but they've also been running into a lot of trouble.

The emissions dip is over

According to the International Energy Agency, following the recession, global carbon growth is apparently now back on track - that is, back up to roughly where business as usual would have put it. The IEA apparently attributes this to growth in developing countries.

I wrote a little while back about how recessions effect growth of emissions, and I talked about some effects that might be long-term - for instance, if recession led to die-off of least-efficient (and hence least economic) manufacturing or energy generation facilities.

But the nasty flip side of this is what happens to this on the other end. If, when demand recovers, it's met by the construction or expansion of newer facilities that make use of recent efficiency technology, great. But if instead what's going on is off-shoring of developed-country manufacturing to developing countries, the closing of least-efficient operations might in fact reduce emissions in developed countries, but demand recovery might lead ultimately to growth in manufacturing in less energy-efficient facilities. (This is assuming developing countries often use older, less efficient equipment, which I believe is often true - developing countries typically have a lower energy intensity, meaning they use more energy per unit GDP.) I wonder if that's part of what's going on here (not to suggest it's the whole story; much of it is probably just regular old growth).

Bottom line: recession emissions dips might not be all sunshine and roses. Heh.